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DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER
NSC FOR COURVILLE AND SHORTLEY

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREF](#) [PHUM](#) [SU](#) [AU](#)
SUBJECT: AU PREPARING TO END DARFUR PKO ON SEPTEMBER 30

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CAMERON HUME; REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D)

¶1. (C) Summary. The African Union,s Ambassador Kingibe has advised AU headquarters that the AU,s only viable option is to end the peacekeeping operation by September 30. At a meeting of AU and international partners on August 24, Kingibe asked the partners to assist the AU in finding a solution to the dysfunctional Ceasefire Commission (CFC), provided a plea for AMIS funding, and announced that President Bashir had asked AU President Konare to a meeting on August 26 to discuss Darfur. The UN Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (D/SRSG) gave a brief, negative assessment of the Sudanese government,s unilateral plan for Darfur. End summary.

Ceasefire Commission

¶2. (C) Ambassador Kingibe raised the problems caused by the decision to exclude DPA non-signatories from meetings of the cease-fire commission. Kingibe reviewed the July meeting and international partners consent to exclude non-signatories from the CFC, despite some mechanisms to maintain non-signatories inclusion in sector sub-commissions. In response to a message from the Sudanese government that it considered DPA non-signatories to be terrorists and outlaws and could no longer assure their security, the AU had asked non-signatory representatives to depart AMIS bases. He asked if the partners thought we should stick to this decision or find a new approach.

¶3. (C) CDA Hume said it was important that all armed factions support the CFC and that non-signatories be engaged. The GoS appeared to be taking a different and dangerous tack by pressing forward with its own plan. DPA implementation was possible only with the government,s (GoS) commitment; its own security plan seemed to point in a different direction. Kingibe announced that President Konare was arriving the evening of August 26, in response to a request by President Bashir to discuss Darfur. After debate, partners agreed to a joint demarche asking the GoS to address the CFC shortcomings and to play a constructive part in making the CFC effective.

DPA Implementation

¶4. (C) Kingibe was disappointed at the lack of DPA implementation. AMIS was working within its means and capabilities to show progress. He was optimistic that AMIS could put into affect the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) soon. (Other sources indicate the AU may appoint Abdul Rahman Swar Addahab, a former interim Sudanese

head of state, to head the dialogue; Embassy Khartoum questions how such an appointment would be received in Darfur.) However, Ambassador Ibok reminded the partners that even the DDDC would require over 17 million dollars to establish and execute. Kingibe acknowledged: there was no funding stream for AMIS beyond September 30; there was no approval by the AU of the AMIS concept of operations; there would be no enhancement⁸ of AMIS operations, as assumed as a basis for transition to a UN force; there was no UNSC decision to replace AMIS; and, there was no consent by the Government of Sudan. Given these conditions, he had advised AU headquarters to plan to end the AMIS operation by September 30. In response to a question by CDA Hume, he said he had not discussed this advice with the Sudanese government.

UN Transition or GoS peace and Stability Plan

¶5. (C) UN Deputy SRSB bluntly stated that planning for the UN transition was in transition. The current plan was for the UN first to strengthen AMIS throughout the balance of the year. He noted that Bashir,s rejection of a UN transition was NCP policy, but the SPLM was now supporting a UN mission. A joint NCP-SPLM committee had been formed to review the issue. He doubted that the committee would change the policy soon.

¶6. (C) Ambassador Hume recalled that the GoS had put its plan on the table as an alternative and asked for a UN assessment. D/SRSB said, &The plan is to make the AU mission irrelevant and to make a UN mission impossible.⁸ He also commented, with regard to DPA signatories, that &those who have signed this agreement have no capacity to implement it.⁸

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Non-military Logistic Support for the Movements

¶7. (C) Kingibe asked the partners if any of the signatories or DOC factions had approached them for non-military support to assist their transition to political parties and to maintain their forces through DPA implementation. He emphasized that SLM expectations were not being met. Without supplies of food and other support, there was significant further danger to the DPA implementation. If other partners did not step forward, the GoS would be the only potential benefactor.

¶8. (C) Comment: Kingibe wants to recover from AMIS,s non-signatory expulsion blunder earlier in the week and to rally partners around a common position. However, in the end he set a marker on the table that the international partners could not expect the AU to implement the DPA without providing the means to succeed. End Comment.
HUME